Podcast of the week: The Demise of the Hungarian Social Democrats

On the 8th of April, Victor Orban’s right-wing populist coalition Fidesz-KDNP won an astonishing 48.9% in the parliamentary election. The Socialist party–Dialogue for Hungary (MSZP), which had been ruling until Orban took power in 2010 and was the major opposition party since then, has received a humiliating 12.25%.

What has happened? Last October, Social Europe’s editor-in-chief Henning Meyer spoke about the demise of the Hungarian social democrats to former EU Commissioner and MSZP politician László Andor. They discuss the unexpected problems which arose from EU accession in 2004, the loss of MSZP’s constituency and Orban’s authoritarian tendencies.

This revealing half-hour is much recommended to those that want to not just shake their heads at Sunday’s results, but understand how contemporary Hungary is rolling.


Opinion: what’s really cooking in the Northern Italian referendums?

During the 1970s, many of the richest regions in Europe rediscovered both their cultural peculiarities and their old intolerance towards central institutions. Northern Italy was no exception. Now, decades later, separatists claims to the legendary ‘Padania’ imagined by the secessionist party Lega Nord (LN) are still relevant. But is independence the only aim?
A campervan promoting Lega Nord in Tuscany, Italy.

Barcelona faced a contested referendum on 1st October, and now Milan and Venice are being called to the polls on October 22nd. The question, as phrased by governors Roberto Maroni and Luca Zaia – both important Lega Nord politicians – leaves little room for interpretation: “Do you want Veneto to be given greater forms and conditions of autonomy?” On the surface, it appears that LN could finally realise its 30 year old dream of a bright, more autonomous future. However, there is more to these referendums than you might think.

A hollow referendum? 

Both referendums are nothing but consultative, and a victory on the autonomists’ side may only lead to years of fruitless negotiations between the central state and these two wealthy regions. Indeed, acquiring a special status for Lombardy and Veneto might not be the real goal of this campaign.

Since its creation in 1989, Lega Nord – literally “the Northern League” – has claimed to be the voice of hard-working populations whose high revenues were, they claimed, unjustly redistributed to the lazy southerners. Backed up by imaginative legends of a common northern history and ethnicity, Lega’s ambition was to divide Italy in two at the Po river, leaving Southern Italy on one side and Padania on the other.

This program mirrored that of several other independentist parties all over Europe, says Italian researcher Emmanuel Dalle Mulle. In his recent book, Dalle Mulle points out how the common thread of all these different parties was “ending the economic ‘exploitation’ suffered by a wealthy nation and supposedly carried out by the population of poorer regions”. In other words, rich nationalism hoped to reshape Europe.

Towards a new strategy

This narrative is fed by the fact that Lombardy and Veneto contribute a significant amount to the national GDP, according to EUROSTAT. While the former produces goods and services worth €357 million, the latter generates an estimated €151 million, which is far more than any other region. It’s therefore easy to understand why the citizens of these northern regions might be tempted to ask for greater financial autonomy. But Lega Nord has since moved beyond their Padania narrative.

However, since Matteo Salvini took the reins of the Lega in 2013, the movement’s separatism ambitions have been overshadowed by a new strategy. Aligning with many other right-wing populist movements, Salvini decided to reshape Lega around Euro-skepticism and a strong critique of current immigration policies. The transformation was completed in April 2014 when, ahead of the European Parliament elections, the slogan “No more euro” replaced the historical “Padania” as the party’s national slogan. At the same time, Salvini launched a parallel movement, Noi con Salvini (Us with Salvini), to reach out to those Italian regions – especially in the South – where Lega previously didn’t have a wide following.

If Salvini’s massive operation did allow Lega Nord to reach – according to the latest surveys – 12.9% of the population, this abrupt restyling doesn’t necessarily resonate with northern voters, who might feel they’ve been abandoned by a movement that used to serve their interests. This is where the referendum card comes in handy.

Just a few years ago, in March 2014, the Italian institute for political and social research Demos published the results of a survey conducted in Veneto. The research showed that 80% of the local population would have opted for independence, had a referendum been held.

Three years later, this data is still relevant, and Salvini knows it: in the north, most voters are still attached to Lega’s old values rather than to its new goals. Although, at the moment, the party seems to be doing better on a national level, the leader risks losing the party’s hard core of loyalists, should the populist, euro-skeptical program lose relevance.

“This referendum is probably the result of a tacit agreement: Salvini accepts Maroni’s and Zaia’s regional nation-building policies and, in exchange, they don’t challenge him on a national level,” says Dalle Mulle.

The researcher, who’s been observing his native Veneto from the Graduate Institute in Geneva for the past three years, also believes the referendums has a more subtle objective: that of strengthening Lega’s positions in the Italian national and regional elections of spring 2018. As Italy now heads into months of tireless election campaigning, even a symbolic victory might alter the political balances within the country’s right wing parties.

“The referendum’s questions are so generic, their answer so self-evident that this might as well be just a purely symbolic issue at this point,” Dalle Mulle states. After all, whether voters will reach for such succulent (albeit low-hanging) fruit is a matter of little doubt.

This guest article was brought to you by Viola Serena Stefanello. Follow her on Twitter here.

Spanish far right

Spain: 4 reasons why far right populism can’t flourish

María Crespo breaks down a new study –‘The Spanish Exception: unemployment, inequality and immigration, but no right-wing popular parties’ ­– in El Mundo.
Spanish far right
The dictatorship of General Franco lasted from the end of the Spanish civil war in 1939 to his death in 1975

Three things tend to trigger far right sentiment, ‘high immigration, economic crisis, and loss of confidence in traditional parties,’ writes María Crespo. And in Spain, conditions are perfect.

Between 2000 and 2009, half of all the migrants arriving in the European Union went to Spain. Most found work in low-skilled posts, often in construction.

When the housing bubble burst in 2007, three million jobs were wiped out, and the ensuing crisis saw a drastic increase in poverty throughout the country.

In 2014, ‘the gap between the richest and poorest in Spain in the widest in all of Europe,’ and frequent political scandals mean people mistrust Spanish politicians, who are blamed for the crisis.

So why has the far right not made any gains?

First, the dictatorship of General Franco, which lasted from the end of the Spanish civil war in 1939 to his death in 1975, has not been forgotten.

Franco’s use of patriotic rhetoric and hijacking of national symbols like the flag, the national anthem, and even the word ‘Spain,’ mean that today patriotism suffers from a ‘severe lack of legitimacy.’

“This heritage will take a long time to disappear,” says Carmen González Enríquez, author of the study, “because many people who witnessed Francoism directly are still alive, and many are still young.”

“Spain was excluded from the EU and globalisation at a time when being European meant being modern and secular,” she adds.

The country joined the EU relatively late, in 1986. Nowadays the Spanish are the least in favour of leaving the Union. Only 10% wish to break away from the bloc, compared to 25% in France.


Second, González Enríquez argues, over the past 15 years, Spain has become more accepting of immigrants, ‘especially from Morocco, Romania, and Sub-Saharan Africa.’

This has been influenced by several factors:

Immigration has been concentrated to a few geographical areas, the Spanish remember their own migration – to other European countries and to Latin America – and because “the Catholic church has historically been strongly supportive of immigration, as many of the newcomers were Catholics.”

This means Spanish politicians have “done all they can to avoid xenophobic rhetoric.”

Peripheral nationalism.
Thirdly, Spain has learned not to make the ‘erroneous link’ between immigration and terrorism.

“Because of the existence of ETA [a violent Basque separatist organisation], Spanish people are able to distinguish between terrorism and the town terrorists come from. They have never blamed everyone in the Basque region for ETA’s terrorism.”

Centrist electorate.

Finally, González Enríquez argues, the Spanish electorate is fundamentally centre-left.

“When we compile the data on where they position themselves on the political spectrum, very few say they are far right.”

Spain, unlike many other countries, is a nation that seems to have learned from its mistakes.