‘Just because the French president gives a good handshake doesn’t mean he sees himself as a champion of the liberal West,’ says Benjamin Haddad in Foreign Policy.
Pitted as ‘a direct repudiation of Trump’s populism,’ Macron was seen as ‘Europe’s best hope for standing up to Trump.’
It was Macron – who once taught philosophy and can recite Molière – the liberal defender of the EU and the free market, versus Trump, the “America First” protectionist who supported Marine le Pen, Macron’s election rival.
Yet, ‘different as they are, Macron and Trump are likely to get on rather well,’ says Haddad.
First, Macron is ‘no Hillary Clinton.’
Despite being a liberal, the French president ran on an anti-establishment platform and criticised both the major parties on the left and right.
‘Like for Trump, few “experts” would have bet on Macron’s victory just a few months before the election.’
And his first bill will aim to “moralise” French politics, imposing maximum terms and ‘barring MPs from hiring family members or working as consultants.’
Did someone say “drain the swamp?”
Second, Macron sees himself as a realist, and has embraced the “Gaullo-Mitterandien” realpolitik tradition of ‘realist French foreign policy.’
And despite his strong criticism of Russian media outlets RT and Sputnik, let’s not forget that early on in his presidency Macron invited Putin to France to discuss cooperation in Syria.
‘For years, this French attitude of independence has raised eyebrows in Washington; these days, it fits perfectly with Trump’s agenda.’
Third, Macron’s “Europe first” attitude ‘seems to dovetail with Trump’s wariness of free-riding allies.’
The French president wants to increase eurozone budgetary coordination, as well as create a finance minister for the bloc.
This will mean ‘convincing Germany to give up on trade surpluses that have reinforced imbalances within the EU,’ and the two nations have already begun discussions for the creation of a European defence fund.
Rather than ‘embracing movements like Brexit that weaken Europe and leave it more dependent, the America First president should welcome European leaders who want to strengthen the continent and shoulder more responsibility for defending their own interests and security,’ says Haddad.
Finally, both Macron and Trump support military action and assertive foreign policy.
He has ‘repeatedly said his top foreign-policy priority would be fighting Islamism,’ and supported the Trump administration’s airstrike of the Syrian Army’s Shayrat airbase.
‘Paris – always more comfortable with hard power than Berlin – could be a more neutral partner for the Trump administration.’
Macron has vowed to increase France’s defence spending to 2 percent of GDP.
Widespread dislike of the new US president saw many people hopefully cast Macron as an ‘anti-Trump champion.’
But the French Constitution grants the president much more freedom in foreign policy than, say, Germany, and the ‘widespread loathing for the US president, real though it may be, is unlikely to have a major impact on Macron’s decision-making.’
Their initial handshake was frosty, ‘and it remains unlikely that Macron and Trump will be taking in any Molière performances together anytime soon, but sometimes a rough handshake can be the start of a fruitful relationship.’
The former Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta is a full-blooded European.
His new book, ‘Through thick and thin’ (‘Contro venti e maree,’ published in Italian only), is his guide to relaunch the European project in the dawn of a new era marked by Donald Trump’s election and Brexit.
Mr Letta, the current Dean of the SciencesPo Paris School of International Affairs, moved to the academic world having held the highest position in Italy’s political system from April 2013 to February 2014 – the coronation of a brilliant political career. He was previously a Member of Italy’s House of deputies and then moved to become a member of the European Parliament (EP) from 2004 to 2006. He also held several cabinet positions in centre-left governments.
Here are the 7 principal changes he believes Europe must make:
Convince the people that Europe is not made for the elites.
Like former French Foreign affairs Minister Hubert Védrine and journalist Jean Quatremer* – both of whom we have recently interviewed – Mr Letta says Europe should show the people that it is not made for the elites. He proposes an extension of the Erasmus program to apprentices, a focus on education, and to help all Europeans adapt to the internet and learn foreign languages, primarily English.
Europeans are like brothers and sisters within a single family.
*However, Mr Letta and Mr Quatremer disagree on several points.
According to Mr Letta, the originality and the force of the European integration project relies on giving every member state the same level of recognition. Whereas, for Mr Quatremer, this is precisely what causes the impotence and decline of the European institutions. He deplores the increase in the number of commissioners to 28, the relative overrepresentation of the small countries in the EP, and the rotating presidency of the Council.
Likewise, Mr Letta says that every commissioner draws their power from his or her remit, not from their nationality, and insists that this principle is the foundation of European integration. Mr Quatremer, however, sees in every commissioner a servant of his or her country of origin, a problem aggravated by the unnecessary representation of every state through a commissioner.
Mr Letta also believes in redirecting European subsidies towards weaker nations.
He would call the plan Dionysus, after the Greek god who is born and reborn again and again. In order for the Europeans to accept change, he recommends that Europe focuses on providing security in the face of change.
Europeans should be rule makers rather than rule takers.
This applies to values. What are the European Values? Our opposition to death penalty is definitely one of them, says Mr Letta. So are gender equality, the promotion of LGBTQI rights, the protection of the environment and heritage, secularism, and the right to work.
The same rules must be applied to all religions.
Mr Letta – a Christian – controversially writes that history shows that Christianity is inseparable from Europe; that Christianity is part of Europe’s identity. But the freedom of religious belief and conscience are among the most cherished European values.
However, does Homo Europeus truly exist, asks Mr Letta? Not as an ethnicity or human race, but as a cultural fact? His answer is yes, although Homo Europeus is hard to define. Europeans are like brothers and sisters within a single family, he says, observe them from outside Europe and their singularity is obvious.
Europe is simply an additional level of identity, on top of the “paese,” – village in Italian – the region, and the country. And the subsidiarity principle is there to help distinguish between the powers of every level.
France should resist Germany more actively.
Now that the UK is out of the picture, France remains the only counterweight to Germany’s supremacy. With its position on the UNO’s Security Council, its nuclear weapons, and military capacity, France should play a more active role on the European stage and in its relationship with Germany, says Mr Letta.
Only France can convince Germany to use its fiscal surplus to help relaunch European growth, to get more involved in security, defence and foreign policy and, last but not least, to accept reforms of the euro.
The euro must be more than a currency.
Let’s consolidate the European Stability Mechanism, complete the Banking Union with a single deposit guarantee fund, create a proper European budget, and appoint a European Finance minister, writes Mr Letta.
Let’s increase the scale of the Juncker Plan in the field of innovation, education and research, as well as giving up the unanimity rule for the Eurozone, and harmonising the taxable bases, starting with environmental taxes.
Europe could also get involved in financing countries that wish to combat unemployment, in exchange for an increased effort to reduce it at national level.
The refugee crisis can be remedied in five steps.
According to Mr Letta, the refugee crisis is, to a large extent, the result of President Bush’s wars.
Though he also points to the West’s big mistakes in Libya and Syria, he believes that if the US Supreme Court had ruled differently regarding the recounting of votes in Florida at the end of the presidential election in 2000, the situation regarding refugees would be radically different today.
Like Mr Védrine, Mr Letta bases his proposal on the necessary distinction between refugees and economic migrants.
This may be a convenient distinction from a moral point of view, but those in charge of enforcing the distinction, whether as civil servants or as magistrates, know that it is often hard to determine whether a migrant should be put in one category or the other.
Moreover, benefitting from the theoretical distinction requires whichever state or organization applying it to effectively deport those classed as economic migrants, which usually doesn’t happen in Europe.
Mr Letta’s first recommendation to European governments is to prevent crises in the ‘sender’ countries through responsible foreign policy and development aid.
Second, Europe must harmonize migration and asylum policies.
Third, the ‘Dublin’ rule – that forces migrants to apply for asylum in the country of arrival – must be changed. (That’s Italy’s ex-Prime minister speaking.)
Fourth, Europe must agree on a common, and shared, refugee relocation policy.
If the US Supreme Court had ruled differently regarding the recounting of votes at the end of the presidential election in 2000, the situation regarding refugees would be radically different today.
Fifth, the European Border Control Agency must secure the continent’s external borders.
Mr Letta believes that the scale of the EU migration policy must be kept within integration limits. “It is clear that diversity becomes a problem when the original population of a country ceases to be the majority.”
However, he doesn’t say whether a limitation based on proportion should be implemented.
It’s time to debrusselize.
Enrico Letta sees in Brexit an opportunity to review the role of the EP. It is time to give the EP what it lacks the most: the power of legislative initiative. Likewise, Mr Letta suggests calling the commissioners ministers.
Mr Letta wants to change practices, not rules.
Deputies should be elected at the European –instead of the national – level.
Consequently, the European Council should draw inspiration from the European Central Bank, whose president is the only one who speaks to the press. There should be fewer summits and more lower-level meetings, while every summit should take place in a different European city.
In order to remedy to the so-called democratic deficit, deputies should be elected at the European –instead of the national – level.
Here, Mr Letta has a bold proposal: the 73 seats about to be given up by British MEPs could be replaced by Europe-wide candidates, and voted in by the single European constituency. Another progressive proposal is to involve the national deputies in the European decision-making process.
We have saved our favourite proposals for last. Civil society is weak because of the barrier of languages, says Letta, so let’s make the learning of foreign languages compulsory and reduce the gap between the multilingual happy few and those who only speak their mother tongue.
And finally, he says, we need Pan-European media outlets.
We couldn’t agree more.
‘Two of the world’s biggest economies are poised to prove that globalisation is not dead,’ said The FT, ‘and that the populist antipathy to free trade has not yet triumphed.’
After four years of trade talks, and several recent negotiating breakthroughs on the ‘sticky questions of cheese and car parts,’ a ‘sweeping’ EU Japan free trade agreement is expected to be completed ahead of the G20 summit in Hamburg on Friday.
European farmers are set to ‘win prized access’ to the Japanese agricultural market, while Japan’s carmakers will no longer be hampered by EU import tariffs.
“We will have full duty free access for almost all agri-food exports,” said one EU official. “Some of the transitions are longer than we would have liked, but in the end it will be fully duty free.”
Crucially for campaign groups, the EU has also said there will be no “investor-state dispute settlement” mechanism in the accord. The format has been widely criticised for allowing multinationals to ‘ride roughshod over local regulations.’
The EU Japan free trade accord is both a ‘powerful rejection’ of Donald Trump’s aggressive protectionism – on the eve of his arrival in Hamburg – and confirmation that a hard Brexit would leave some UK companies on ‘worse trade terms’ with their European neighbours than ‘Japanese competitors halfway around the world.’
The accord with the ‘fourth-largest import market in the world’ will be a boost for European farmers, cheese-makers and vintners ‘at a time when rural communities on the continent are being courted by populist forces.’
In Japan, the free trade agreement will be a victory for Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The agreement will ‘force change on unproductive parts of the Japanese economy, particularly agriculture.’
Mr. Abe had originally hoped the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership would fulfil this function until Donald Trump scrapped it.
In the long term, the EU Japan deal ‘may increase pressure on Mr. Trump to reconsider his anti-trade animus.’
His ‘suspicion of globalisation’ focuses mainly on China, a country he casts as ‘keen to dominate the west.’
30 years ago, the US and Europe characterised Japan in exactly the same way.
‘That Japan’s commercial hegemony never materialised, and that it is now a welcome trade partner, illustrates how badly protectionist arguments age as the global economy moves on.’
While the US and the UK, the two countries who ‘built the global liberal trading order,’ turn inward, Japan and the EU ‘must continue to lead.’
Shinzo Abe and his government must maintain good relations with the countries remaining in the TPP agreement, and Europe must look to deepen trade with other markets, such as South America and Mexico.
‘As the rest of the world comes together, the UK and the US risk being left behind – or forced to rethink their repudiation of the global order they built.’
Withdrawal from the Paris agreement on climate change will leave the United States as one of just three countries outside the accord, alongside Syria and Nicaragua.
US President Donald Trump announced on June 1st that America will not ratify an international pact to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. In a speech delivered in the White House Rose Garden, Mr Trump – who has now been in office for 137 days – stated that the Paris agreement would pose an economic burden on America and tarnish its sovereignty.
According to a recent survey by the Yale Programme on Climate Communication, not only do 86% of Democrats want to remain in the accord, but so do 51% of Republicans.
So far, numerous global leaders have been critical of the decision. Newly elected President of France Emmanuel Macron became a trending hashtag on Twitter on Saturday after using Trump’s campaign slogan to finish off a speech condemning the US President’s decision: “wherever we live, whoever we are, we all share the same responsibility; make our planet great again.”
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Across the channel, British Prime Minister Theresa May declined to echo other EU leaders, who have urged the leader of the world’s largest economy – and second greatest polluter – to think again. “It’s up to the President of the United States to decide what position the United States is going to take on this matter,” she told reporters on the campaign trail.
However, according to Matthew Karnitsching in Politico, “Trump’s decision to ditch the Paris climate deal only cements his reputation in Europe as a danger to the planet, transforming Europe’s newfound air of superiority into a full swagger.”
It should be noted that the US President’s power over environmental policy is limited. States have substantial autonomy on climate policy, and in many cases – such as in California – have even stricter standards than Washington. “The administration’s decision to leave the Paris agreement will have no impact on those regulations” said The Washington Post.
During his electoral campaign, Trump infamously called climate change “a hoax created by and for the Chinese.”
The concept of global warming was created by and for the Chinese in order to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive.
— Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) November 6, 2012
Chinese Premier Li Keqiang told reporters during a visit to Berlin that fighting global warming was a “global consensus” and an “international responsibility.”
Scientists say Earth is likely to reach more dangerous levels of warming sooner if the US retreats from the Paris agreement because of how much America contributes to rising temperatures. Their withdrawal could release up to 3 billion additional tons of carbon dioxide a year – enough to contribute to higher seas, disappearing ice caps and extreme weather.
As the 25th of May rapidly approaches, NATO seems to be reworking its usual summit to suit the notoriously short attention span of US President Donald Trump.
According to Foreign Policy, the organisation is telling the heads of state of the 27 member countries to shorten their talks to 2 to 4 minutes.
The alliance has also scrapped plans to publish the traditional formal meeting declaration.
The official reason: unlike precedents such as the Warsaw gathering of 2016, Brussels is not hosting a full summit, and the meeting is tailored to be more focused. Behind closed doors, however, officials gave Foreign Policy another reason: “they’re worried Trump won’t like it.”
As NATO scrambles to prepare a gathering fit for Donald Trump, the President’s level of interest remains unclear. After dismissing the organisation as “obsolete” during his campaign, Trump went back on his statement during a meeting with NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg in April.
No longer obsolete, the alliance remains on edge: “the President’s erratic policy shifts and surprise Twitter storms on other international issues have NATO jittery,” stated a former senior NATO official to Foreign Policy.
The former British ambassador to Washington, Peter Westmacott, explained to the New York Times that there were three things to bear in mind in meetings with Trump: “this is a guy who likes to win,” who has a pragmatic sense of deal making, and a short attention span.
On the other hand, his preference for one-to-one diplomacy also requires a focus on personal interaction and chemistry, states the same paper.
Beyond the issue of successfully entertaining the President enough to capture his attention, however, two serious political issues need discussing: counterterrorism and burden sharing.
The US is pushing for NATO’s involvement in the Counter-Islamic State coalition, while officials tell Foreign Policy that Germany remains sceptical to the idea.
Though NATO members are committed at the national level, the alliance is not yet an official member of the coalition.
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On the other hand, Trump maintains the position that NATO does not share enough of the burden of defence spending.
The President’s suggestion that the alliance needs to have its arm twisted on the matter has not been well received in Europe. The allies signed a pledge in 2014 to increase defence spending long before Trump gave his opinion, explains Tomáš Valášek, the former Slovakian ambassador to NATO, to Politico.
Unfortunately, Donald Trump’s signature style is not subtlety. NATO, brace yourself.
What does Donald Trump really think about the European Union?
In the past, he has supported the extreme-right’s Marine Le Pen in the French Presidential election, advocated slapping hefty trade tariffs on German imports, and threatened to undermine the EU with bilateral trade deals with individual nations.
But Trump has developed a reputation for agreeing with his most recent interlocutor: he isn’t afraid to change his mind.
Though he is still seen as much more of a threat to the EU than former President Barack Obama ever was, more recently he seems to have softened. He has relented in his anti-NATO rhetoric, and even congratulated Emmanuel Macron on his election victory last Sunday.
So, with Trump at the helm, how have US-European relations changed? Is Angela Merkel the new public enemy number one? And what does the United States’ new, amorphous relationship with Europe mean for the future of the EU?
We spoke to Nicole Bacharan, a historian and political scientist specialising in American politics and Franco-American relations, about how Trump views Europe, how the EU can take advantage of his Presidency, Brexit, and what – if anything – Europe can learn from the US.
TPE We have witnessed a radical change in the US’ attitude towards Europe since Mr. Trump came to power. What makes Europe less relevant and desirable in the new American government’s eyes?
NB I don’t think it is less relevant, even if Donald Trump might wish it to be that way. He seems to be aware that Germany is important. He congratulated Emmanuel Macron on his election but probably hardly knows anything about France. He identified the forces behind Brexit or Marine Le Pen’s National Front as populist, nationalist movements close to his own views. He wished for a break up of the European Union, but it seems that he is coming around. Same with NATO: at first he said it was obsolete, and now he has gone back on that statement – NATO is “modern” again. Other presidents have had similar changes of heart, but in a less exaggerated, extreme, and vulgar way.
Relations with Europe were smooth and efficient during the Obama administration.
Barack Obama certainly knew that Europe was relevant, but as he considered everything to be going smoothly, he did not believe that it required special attention. There was real competition with the US on trade issues, which is a normal, healthy thing. But overall, whether it was about police work, anti-terrorism, military cooperation, control cooperation, or political cooperation, relations with Europe were smooth and efficient during the Obama administration.
So at first Obama himself showed little personal interest in Europe. He missed a few important moments, such as the anniversary of the fall of the Berlin wall or the Paris Charlie Hebdo rally.
Eventually, however, he came to see the importance of Europe, and did not take it for granted. He urged against Brexit, he supported German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and after the end of his presidency, he supported Emmanuel Macron, who is a true pro-European. What is happening between Europe and Donald Trump is not of the same nature, as he looks down on Europe and NATO. But eventually, facts and reality will catch up with him and he will start to see that there are a limited number of democracies in the world, and that they need each other and have common interests.
So I think Europe is still relevant, even if Donald Trump shows little interest.
TPE Should Europe fear military and diplomatic disengagement from the USA?
NB If it happens, yes, it is something to fear. Europe is vulnerable, particularly on its Eastern borders. I am quite convinced Russia is an aggressive power, pushing with relative impunity as much as they can. Hence why Georgia, the Ukraine, and the Baltic states are so concerned.
The Russians have conducted military flying exercises over the North Sea – sometimes as far as Brittany –, which demonstrates their antagonistic attitude. It is vital for the US to have a military presence in Europe, and so far, it has been a constant: in the last days of the Obama administration, a new batch of American troops were posted in Poland.
As for Donald Trump, he is conducting a cost analysis of alliances, assessing their different costs and the extent of their usefulness. Being upset at the Europeans for not paying enough for their own defence is an old grievance for the United States, and it’s understandable. We heard the same thing from Barack Obama and George Bush, but alliances are not only about money.
They are also about mutual interests – like global stability – and if Donald Trump does not look beyond this cost analysis, it will be very dangerous for Europe. Nothing is predictable with this administration. US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson seems to be more of a moderate in this respect, but he is certainly focussing on the financial aspects of the alliance.
On the other hand, we can see that Donald Trump is very excited about military power and the Pentagon’s formidable arsenal. I really do not know how it will play out. He is coming to Europe at the end of this month for the NATO summit as well as the G7. This is a step in the right direction because initially it was unclear whether or not he would attend.
Maybe the Europeans can nudge him towards a more stable military and diplomatic engagement, but it is by no means a sure thing. And if the US were to disengage, it would be very dangerous, not only for Europe, but also for the global stability.
TPE Do you think the Baltic states are at risk of being invaded?
NB I think that if left on their own, they are at risk of a Ukraine-Georgia situation: not a full invasion, but a low level conflict with the Russians encroaching further onto their territories. The Baltic states are very worried: they pay their full dues to NATO – a total of 2% of their GDP – but they are small economies, and have reasons to be scared.
TPE Could such disengagement be an opportunity for Europe to make progress with its common foreign and security policies and, more broadly, its unification process?
NB It could be. It should be. That would be the most reasonable thing to do. European countries should closely study their military budgets, cut out all that is redundant, and develop their common capabilities.
The election of Emmanuel Macron is most definitely an opportunity. The promises he made to work closely with Germany were very favourably received. There was such relief in Germany after his election: they seem willing to help him, especially economically. So maybe, if France and Germany kick on with foreign and security policy, more countries in the EU could follow, and US disengagement could become an opportunity.
The US administration will feel more and more besieged, soon they will start to turn on themselves.
TPE Can the UK rely on the special relationship with the USA to free itself from the European Union and come back stronger after Brexit?
NB I don’t think so. Despite appearances, I don’t think anybody can rely on the United States for anything right now, unfortunately. And this isn’t going to improve: the administration is so vulnerable what with all the investigations, accusations of corruption, and allegations of abuse of power. My understanding, and I may be wrong there, is that the administration will feel more and more besieged, and soon they will start to turn on themselves. So the UK can’t count on much from the United States.
Obviously, it appears that disentangling the UK from the European Union is going to be such a tedious, painful, and costly process. Marine Le Pen has repeated that despite everybody predicting armageddon after Brexit, the British economy is doing well. But Brexit hasn’t happened yet! When it truly does, we have no idea what it will look like for Britain.
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TPE Plus there has been a 10% decrease on the UK exchange rate, so it is incorrect to claim that there has been no harm done to the British economy so far…
NB Absolutely. And it’s going to get worse.
TPE Are there American federal institutions, laws or practices that the Europeans could draw on or learn from in their project of refounding Europe?
I think they could truly learn from the early days of the American Republic. After the Revolution and independence, for quite a few years, there was no American Constitution as we know it. Instead, there was only the Articles of Confederation, which were very loose, had few government institutions, and a very weak federal government. It didn’t work, especially in terms of defending trade and monetary interests.
Studying the early days of the American Republic would certainly be very helpful for the European Union.
At the time, the struggle was between the ideas of Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson. Hamilton was very aware of the overall weakness, and recognised the need for a stronger federal government and a central bank. A government that would have, and still has today, the power to raise taxes all over the federal territory and to unify federal tax laws and centralise power. That is what the EU lacks today.
The European executive power lacks the necessary tools to make it work, especially when it comes to a centralised and unifying taxing system within the Euro zone. Studying the early days of the American Republic would certainly be very helpful for the European Union, and beyond that, the US has a strong Constitution that is sometimes frustrating because of its rigidity, but it prevents any drastic or fast change. Hence why Donald Trump seems so frustrated.
TPE How viable or inspirational do you believe the Federalist dream of a ‘United States of Europe’ is?
NB It’s very inspirational to me personally, but I doubt it fits the mood of the time! It seems to me that France, Germany, and other countries should be very cautious while gathering together around a common plan. They need to really improve the way they “sell” Europe to the European people.
The anti-Europe propaganda we heard during the French elections, with this absurd rule of giving the same amount of time to every single 11 candidates, was shameful. 8 of the 11 – some of them who represented a very small section of the electorate – continually slandered the European Union with all kinds of inaccuracies and lies. I’m not saying that people who do not want the European Union should not have a voice, but it was so unbalanced, unchecked, and destructive, in so many ways.
The EU needs to better explain the benefits that it gives to many people and institutions in its member states. There is obviously a lot of work to do to improve the way the EU functions. It is true that there are too many rules, that it is too complicated, bureaucratic, and intrusive. EU social policy also needs to be improved if we want European societies to progress.
So although the federalist dream of a ‘United States of Europe’ is very inspirational to me and to people like me, I think there is a lot of work to do before trying to promote that dream again.
TPE Do Trump’s hostilities towards Germany and Angela Merkel, and the mutual threats of trade tariffs, show that we are living in a ‘post-Western’ society?
NB We are certainly verging on a post-Western society. It has not happened yet because Donald Trump does not even represent his own party. We are seeing that despite his aggressive rhetoric towards Canada and towards Mexico, little has happened so far. Again, reality has a way of imposing itself.
The same applies to China. Throughout his campaign, and even at his inauguration, all talk about China was that they were manipulating currency. Yet all of a sudden, China is apparently no longer a currency manipulator. As a matter of fact, it is, but Donald Trump isn’t talking about it anymore because he was told – or perhaps he realised – that it was counterproductive.
There is no way he can work closely with Angela Merkel. They are so different, and even if Wolfgang Schaüble [German finance minister] was the next Chancellor, the relationship wouldn’t be very easy with Germany.
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But reality will kick in again, Germany is an essential partner, you can’t do anything without them in the West. So, with mutual threats of trade tariffs, I think we were headed for Armageddon had Marine Le Pen [extreme right presidential candidate] or Jean Luc Mélenchon [far-left presidential candidate] been elected in France. But with a strong Franco-German axis, this is still very much a Western society: the Western world. I think we’ve dodged a bullet.
We bought some time, but I don’t know how much.
We are verging on a post-Western society.
TPE Finally, as in the recent TV debate between Emmanuel Macron and Marine Le Pen, you have carte blanche to talk about a European subject close to your heart
NB I don’t know if it’s relevant to this interview in particular, but I think it’s relevant to Europe and the Transatlantic relations. I believe we should guard ourselves from forgetting where we come from. My grandfather fought in WW1, my mother was in the resistance as a teenager, and when I hear talk of nationalism – including economic nationalism – and of border disputes, I am convinced that we are entering into a dangerous debate.
People like Donald Trump are very dangerous because they do not understand or care about the hazardous implications these discourses create, and I am glad there are other people in France, in Germany, and in other European countries who realise this.
Nationalism in Europe has lead to war many times in our history. The bottom line is that we need a united Europe to protect peace and build a better economy.
Jonathan Haidt explores the sharp divisions in America and Europe — and provides a vision for how both might move forward.
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